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ABSTRACT 
IS security policy non-compliance is a problem experienced globally. Organizations have 
implemented formal and informal sanctions to enforce policy compliance. Sanctions can be 
positive (rewards) or negative (punishment) and may influence employees differently across 
different cultures. We propose an examination of antecedents that influence IS security policy 
compliance utilizing Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Deterrence Theory in a global 
context. Using six different countries, we plan to find if protection motivation and deterrence 
factors differ among different cultures through the influence of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizations continue to daily struggle protecting their information systems from various 
threats and spend billions of dollars to build defenses to counter these threats. Some of these 
threats include natural and manmade disasters, errors by internal employees, acts of competitors 
with malicious intent, hackers, spyware and viruses (Loch et al. 1992; Willison and Warkentin 
2012). The reliance of organizations on information systems and increased connectivity of 
organizational information systems to the internet has increased the exposure to threats from 
hackers, spyware and viruses (Whitman 2003). The increased threats, along with increased 
reliance on information systems, have made most organizations enforce strong countermeasures 
to deter these threats. Measures such as physical controls and strict information security policies 
have been implemented across most organizations to counter threats to their information 
systems. 
The threat landscape is further complicated by globalization – organizations have offices and 
conduct business operations in multiple countries and employ individuals from different cultures. 
In global organizations, special difficulties arise in creating and maintaining effective 
information security policies (Long 2004), due to differences in espoused values, traditions, and 
practices among business units, as well as variations in their political, economic and legal 
environments. Individual attitudes and behaviors, influenced by the national culture of each 
individual, have exacerbated these cross-cultural challenges as employees from different cultural 
backgrounds interpret global information security policies differently. Many studies have found 
that cultural differences significantly influence an individual’s behavioral intention to perform 
secure actions and actual secure behaviors themselves because perceptions about certain facets of 
attitudes and behaviors differ in each culture. In IS research, cross-cultural studies have found 
that individual’s cultural background significantly influences the design, adoption and use of 
information systems (Im et al. 2011; Jong-min 2004). In the context of information security, 
although many studies have looked at security policy compliance intention of employees using 
theories such as Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975), Deterrence Theory (Straub and 
Nance 1990), Neutralization Theory (Siponen and Vance 2010), there have been few studies 
conducted that evaluated security-related behaviors across cultures, let alone the impact of 
cultural values on security policy compliance by individuals. A recent cross-cultural study on 
information systems misuse in the U.S and South Korea (Hovav and D’Arcy 2012) found that 
deterrent effects of certain security counter measures varied between the two countries along 
with age and gender, but the role of culture itself as a direct or indirect antecedent of secure 
behaviors was not evaluated.  
The proposed study will focus on formal and informal sanctions which are also known as 
punishment or “negative sanctions.” This study will also focus on formal and informal rewards 
which are also known as “positive sanctions.”  According to the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) 
and several other criminology theories, humans try to achieve pleasure (rewards/positive 
sanctions) and avoid pain (punishment/negative sanctions). Our study will investigate the 
differential effect of national culture on how protection motivation and rewards and punishment 
(formal and informal sanctions) will influence employees’ intention to comply with 
organizational policies.  How do employee compliance intentions differ across several unique 
countries with vastly different cultures? Under the right circumstances, various punishments 
(negative sanctions) have been shown to deter undesirable or deviant behavior.  Both formal and 
informal sanctions are normally viewed only as negative tools by management (or by society).  
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But “sanctions” can encompass both positive and negative organizational events, as illustrated in 
Table 1. As exemplified in the table, while a demotion is a negative work-related sanction, a 
raise or promotion would be a positive one. Moreover sanctions can also be formal or informal. 
Being insulted for poor job performance is a negative informal sanction, but receiving pubic 
praise for good work performance is a positive sanction. Thus the objective of our study is to 1) 
determine if influences of protection motivation differs across cultures; 2) to determine if the 
influence of the presence of positive and negative formal and informal sanctions towards 
behavioral intentions differ across cultures; 3) to determine if the security policy compliance 
intentions influenced by protection motivation and presence of sanctions differ across different 
cultures. 
Table 1. Examples of positive and negative formal and informal sanctions 
  Rewards (Positive Sanctions) Punishment (Negative Sanctions) 
Formal pay raise at the job, performance bonus, job promotion 
reprimand, demotion, or employment 
termination 
Informal praise or recognition for a job well done 
public ridicule or insult for bad job 
performance, social or self-disapproval 
RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975) and Deterrence Theory (Straub and Nance 1990; 
Straub 1990) form the primary foundations for the present study.  Protection Motivation Theory 
(PMT) suggests that individuals act to avoid and prevent threats to their safety and security if and 
when they perceive that the threat is sufficiently severe and if they perceive that they are 
susceptible to the threat (Rogers 1975). In addition to the appraisal of threat severity and threat 
susceptibility, individuals also form perceptions of the recommended response to the threat by 
assessing their own individual capabilities (self-efficacy), coupled with an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the response (response efficacy) (Bandura and Adams 1977; Witte 1992; Witte 
et al. 1996). These two parallel appraisals, threat appraisal and coping appraisal, form the 
foundation for the individual user’s behavioral intention to carry out or execute the 
recommended response to the threat (Witte 1992, Witte 1996). Previous studies have shown that 
threat appraisal and coping appraisal variables, which are the foundation of the Protection 
Motivation Theory  influence security behavior of individuals (Johnston and Warkentin 2010; 
LaRose et al. 2008; Lee and Larsen 2009; Woon et al. 2005; Workman et al. 2008). When 
individuals are facing a threat, they are likely to adopt protective behaviors or technologies to 
deter the threat. 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB) (Ajzen 1991), which explains the relationships between attitude, intention and behavior of 
individuals, have been used widely in IS research and IS security research as well. TPB defines 
attitude as an individual’s like or dislike towards a specific behavior and posits that attitude 
influences an individual’s intention to carry out that behavior. The relationship between attitude 
and behavioral intention has been tested in the context of information security where behavioral 
intention to comply with security policies was found to be significantly influenced by attitudes 
towards those policies (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009). Further, intention has been 
established as a primary antecedent of behavior. 
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Having information security policies in place will not protect an organization from security 
threats unless the employees actually follow them (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). Employees 
who are aware of their organization’s IS security policies may still violate them in certain 
instances.  General Deterrence Theory (GDT), borrowed from the criminology discipline, has 
been used by IS security researchers to identify the influence of deterrents or sanctions on 
negative behavior such as disobedience of or noncompliance with rules and policies (“deviant 
behavior”). GDT posits that security countermeasures can serve as deterrent mechanisms by 
increasing perceptions of the certainty, severity and celerity of punishment for non-compliance 
of security policies, thus improving security of information systems of organizations. Findings in 
criminology show that perceived certainty, severity and celerity of sanctions are negatively 
associated with the intention to engage in criminal or socially deviant behaviors (Nagin and 
Pogarsky 2001). Previous research in IS Security has adopted and extended deterrence theory in 
different contexts, such as testing for influence on behaviors such as software piracy (Peace et al. 
2003), security policy compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Pahnila et al. 
2007), IS Security effectiveness (Kankanhalli et al. 2003), and IS Misuse intention (D’Arcy et al. 
2009).  
Perceived certainty of detection and perceived severity of sanctions were both found to have a 
significant negative impact on behavioral intention to behave in noncompliant behavior while 
some studies found only one of those variables significant. Although previous IS Security 
research seems to have moderately consistent findings on perceived certainty of detection and 
perceived severity of sanctions, extant studies have largely ignored the perceived celerity of 
sanctions. Perceived celerity is defined as the swiftness with which sanctions are applied after 
the detection of non-compliance or maladaptive behavior. Research indicates that some 
individuals (in some cultures) have a shorter term perspective and others are oriented toward 
longer-term processes and outcomes, which may lead to differences in the influence of sanction 
celerity. 
Our study seeks to find if differences exist in attitudes of individuals in different cultures towards 
security policy compliance and if the perceptions of certainty, vulnerability and celerity of 
formal and informal, positive and negative sanctions influence behavioral intention to comply 
with security policies differently among individuals of different cultures. 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The present study proposes and tests a theoretical model, shown in Figure 1, assuming that the 
behavioral intention of individuals to comply with organizational security policies are strongly 
influenced by formal sanctions, informal sanctions and security policy attitude, where the 
security policy attitude is influenced by the threat appraisal and coping appraisal of PMT.  
Warkentin et al. Informal Sanctions across Cultures 
 
 
Proceedings of the Seventh Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Orlando, December 15, 2012.            5 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
According to the TPB and TRA, attitude influences behavioral intention. Previous IS research 
models utilizing TRA and TPB has found this relationship to be significant (Karahanna et al. 
1999). IS security research models that hypothesized employee’s attitude towards behavioral 
intention to comply with security policies have yielded mixed results.  For example, whereas 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) supported a significant relationship, Herath and Rao (2009) found the 
relationship insignificant. In different cultures where attitudes are shaped through their national 
culture, we expect the attitudes to have different influence levels, including those found in the six 
countries we will study.  
We hypothesize the threat appraisal variables (perceived severity, perceived vulnerability) and 
the coping appraisal variables (self-efficacy and response efficacy) to have a positive influence 
on attitudes towards security policies whereas the coping appraisal variable response cost to have 
a negative influence on security policy attitudes. The security policy attitudes in turn will 
positively affect employee security policy compliance. The informal positive, informal negative, 
formal positive and formal negative sanctions will also have a positive influence on security 
policy compliance. Furthermore, we hypothesize the perceived severity, certainty and celerity of 
formal and informal negative and positive sanctions will have a positive influence on security 
policy compliance. 
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RESEARCH METHOD 
In testing our model, an instrument containing a scenario followed by a set of questions will be 
administered to the selected set of respondents from each of the six countries described below. 
The questions will measure all the Protection Motivation variables (perceived severity, perceived 
venerability, self-efficacy, response efficacy, response cost), perceived severity, perceived 
certainty and perceived celerity of positive and negative informal and formal sanctions, security 
policy attitude and the behavioral intention to comply with security policies. Our sample will 
consist of employees from a diverse set of organizations within the selected countries. 
Furthermore, the instrument will capture Hofstead’s five cultural dimensions as explained in 
Table 2. 
For the proposed study, we will evaluate employees in Singapore, Sri Lanka, U.A.E, Finland, 
and the U.S.  These countries were selected for several reasons.  First, these countries have 
significantly different scores on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as shown on Table 2, which 
suggests individuals within these countries may exhibit different intentions and behaviors, based 
on differences in espoused cultural values. Though Singapore, U.A.E, and Sri Lanka are all 
Asian cultures, they have significant differences on several dimensions and are significantly 
different from U.S. in all dimensions. Second, the U.S. (Leidner and Kayworth 2006) and 
Singapore (Teo et al. 2008; Yang 2005) have been studied in prior cross-cultural studies in prior 
IS research and Singaporean culture is similar to the culture of South Korea, which is a country 
frequently used in cross cultural studies. Third, Finland, as a European country, represents 
another unique perspective in terms of cultural differences. Finally, one or more authors of this 
study has visited, lived in, and experienced the cultures of each of the six countries which 
enables us to effectively develop the hypotheses and interpret the results utilizing the in-depth 
understanding of each of these cultures. We focused our comparison of the six countries on all of 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Even though (Hovav and D’Arcy 2011) believe that Hofstede’s 
masculinity/femininity dimension is not deemed closely related to the IS security domain, we 
believe in certain Asian cultures it may have a prominent influence in an organizational 
environment.  
Table 2: Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
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CONTRIBUTION 
If the proposed hypotheses are supported, the findings of our study will have contributions in 
terms of IS security research and practice by examining whether deterrence theory and protection 
motivation theory influences individuals’ policy compliance differently when it comes to diverse 
cultures. In terms of research contributions, our study would be the first to combine Protection 
Motivation Theory along with Deterrence Theory in a cross cultural context. The findings will 
also be helpful in organizational decision making process when dealing with creation of 
organizational policies. Some of the US-based organizations have branches located in several 
countries of the world. Having a ‘one policy fits all’ approach may not necessarily be successful 
to these companies, as employees in different cultures are likely to perceive threats and sanctions 
differently. The findings will assist these organizations to gain an in-depth understanding of how 
these different cultures perceive the threat and coping appraisal variables and how they perceive 
the positive and negative informal and formal sanctions. With that understanding, these 
organizations can customize their security policies at different locations across different 
countries, to cater the cultural aspects of the organization and their employees.  
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